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As for the grenade lobbed in the Conservancy's
direction, the Court in effect snagged it before detonation and threw it back, declining to exercise jwisdiction,
since the IRS had taken no action to revoke the
Conservancy's tax-exempt status. (Note that the Justice
Department, not the IRS, is responsible for the
Government's case in the Claims Court) We believe it
is safe to predict that there will be no further skirmishing
on this front.
But on the government's final contention, that
benefits to the McLennans (other than tax benefits)
defeated the deduction, the court was unwilling to
render summary judgment Unable to determine whether
such alleged benefits were "merely incidental to a
greater public conservation benefit," the court determined that the facts underlying the issues of donative
intent and exclusive conservation purpose "warrant
further ventilation." At trial, then, the McLennans were
to bear the burden of proving that those requirements
were met.
If you are puzzled about the Government's stance
in this matter, dear reader, you are in good and substantial
company. The Claims Court opinion hints that the
Government intended to assert that the McLennans
were motivated to preserve property values and achieve,
by the voluntary easement conveyance, the equivalent
of zoning restrictions. Preserving property values by
giving up substantial and valuable elements of ownership (as the court has already determined to have occurred), seems a rather peculiar way to go. And as for
the achievement of zoning restrictions through an
easement program, that is the inevitable object and
purpose of any successful conservation effort which
uses the conservation easement as a major strategy.
As to the necessary "exclusive conservation purpose", which the court also required to be "ventilated"
at trial, we should note that theM cLennan case involves
the predecessor to the present conservation easement
statute. But if the Government insists upon a subjecti ve
application of that requirement, as it would seem it
intends to do, a decision in its favor would have dire
implications for interpreting the present conservation
easement provisions as well. See § 170(h)(1)(C).
The posture of the Government's case is discouragingly reminiscent of the attitude of Treasury at the time
the current conservation easement provisions were in
gestation. It was then the Treasury's profound belief
that no charitable contribution deduction should obtain
when a donor, by conveying an easement, advanced his
ardent desire to see his property preserved in perpetuity.
Under those circumstances, went the Treasury line,
there can be no gift at all. Fortunately, Congress opted
for an objective determination of what constitutes a
donation in a conservation easement setting. But, as the

entanglement of the McLennans with our public servants proves, it is often possible to get a second opinion
after Congressional incentives have inspired socially
desirable conduct. About the best that can be said about
all of this is that it is probably good for us, now and then,
to confront these fundamental issues. (The McLennans
went back to court in May; the second decision has not
yet been reported. We shall keep you posted.)
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McLennan v. U.S., 91-1 USTC ,50,230 (Cl. Ct. 1991).

Of Unrequited Deductions (and Lost
Hopes)
by William T. Hutton
The Back Forty Chutzpah Award, bestowed at irregular intervals for breathtaking aspirations in income
tax planning, goes this month to Grover and Mary Hope
of Dallas, Texas. In 1984, the Hopes, dissatisfied with
an administrative condemnation award attributable to
the taking of their property for an extension of the Dallas
North Tollway, decided to go to court.
In 1986, by judicial decree, their initial award of
$607,396 was amplified by an additional $1,650,137.
Happy ending? Might well have been, but for the fact
that, against this discordant theme of condemnation and
confrontation, the taxpayers heard a sweeter melody,
the clinking of tax benefits. (Like a dog whistle, it may
not have been audible to all listening ears.)
Specifically, the taxpayers alleged that they had
made a charitable contribution to the Texas Turnpike
Authority in the form of a bargain sale. Pursuant to their
own $4,038,623 estimate of value for the condemned
property, they claimed a charitable contribution of
$1,781,089 (the approximate difference between the
property's alleged fair market value and the total condemnation award). Not surprisingly, the IRS took
exception to this treatment, disallowed the charitable
deductions, which spanned three taxable years, and
asserted liabilities for additional taxes, penalties, and
interest of over $1.4 million. The Hopes paid the
assessed deficiencies, filed refund claims, and, upon
IRS denial of those claims, took their case to the Claims
Court.
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It has been our belief that a charitable contribution
could indeed be effected in the contex t of a condemnation
proceeding. See Herbert O. Robinson, 33 T.C.M. 1140
(1974 ) (charitable deduction denied, but on finding that
the value of the property did not exceed the condemnation award). If, for example, a landowner, aware of a
legitimate threat of condemnation but prior to the instigation of proceedings, conveys the subject property to
a land trust, there would seem to be no inherent llKun
sistency between the assertion of a charitable contribution
deduction and the reinvestment of the bargain sale
proceeds in qualifying replacement property (see IRC
§ 1033). The amount of the charitable contribution
would of course be subject to examination, as in any
bargain sale case.
The claims court decision in Hope, rendered upon
motion for summary jUdgment, was a complete victory
for the Government, and forces us to reexamine our
thinking about the condemnation/bargain sale transaction. The court was of "the opinion that a charitable
contribution tax deduction should not be based on a
completed condemnation proceeding, in which the state
takes the land for a legitimate public purpose, and the
landowner receives compensation .... " The opinion
seems grounded upon the finding that "just" compensation, as determined by the condemnation proceeding,
firmly establishes the value of the property, leaving no
room for the assertion of any bargain element. Thus,
"once Grover Hope agreed to and was paid the compensation, he retained no further rights in the property." Or,
to put it slightly differently, once Grover had settled
with tile state, the property's value was established for
all collateral purposes. Thus interpreted, Grover Hope's
travail ought not to be read as precluding the establishment of a charitable deduction on the transfer of
property subject to threat of condemnation, so long as
there has been no adjudication of property value in the
state courts.
Whether or not other courts accept the Claims
Court's categorical rule (no room for charitable deduction
once adjudication has established the property's value),
it is likely to prove exceedingly difficult to establish that
a gift was intended once the taxpayer and the condemning
authority have locked horns on the valuation issue.
Message: Assess the contribution strategy as soon as
awareness of the threat of condemnation arises, and
involve a private charitable organization, the better to
bolster evidence of "disinterested generosity".

According to a recent Tax Court opinion, the grant
of a facade easement intended to protect an historic
property constitutes a partial disposition of the rehabilitated property for purposes of the recapture provisions
of Internal Revenue Code Section 47. The decision
endorses a prior administrative position; Revenue Ruling
89-90, 1989-2 C.B.3.
Rome I, Ltd. (Rome), a limited partnership formed
to acquire, rehabilitate and operate commercial property in Rome, Georgia, brought the suit when the IRS
granted Rome only part of a 25% rehab tax credit Rome
had claimed for restoring a historic building in its
community. Within the same tax year, the partnership
had deeded a facade and conservation easement to the
Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation.
Though the IRS concluded that the easement was a
"qualified conservation contribution" under section
170(h), it maintained that the donation constituted a
partial disposition of the underlying real property. That
disposition, the court held, required Rome to recapture
a portion of the rehab tax credit. (S ince the rehabilitation
and contribution occurred in the same year, that "recapture" was effected by simply reducing the basis of
the property with respect to which the rehab credit was
computed.)
The case turned on the court's construction of
the term "disposition," interpreted as "transfer(ing) or
otherwise relinquish(ing) ownership of property."
Requiring recapture, the court concluded, gave effect
to Congress' intent to deny double benefits (i.e.,
rehab credit and charitable contribution attributable to
the same expenditures).
The decision is consistent in principle with
another, analogous IRS position as to easements on
land subject to special-use (usually, farmland)
valuation for estate tax purposes under section
2032A. In Letter Ruling 8731001 (March 19,1987),
the Service held that the sale of an agricultural
conservation easement with respect to such land will
be treated as a disposition per §2032A(c)(I)(A),
causing imposition of additional estate tax. (After
Rome, the Service would presumably take the same
view as to a donated easement)

Hope v. U.S., U.S. Claims Court, 91 TNT 180-11
(August 28, 1991).

Rome I, Ltd., 96 T.C. 697 (May 2, 1991)

September 1991

b

The

Facade Easements and Rehab Credits:
The Code Giveth and The Code Taketh
Away
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